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The ability to perform computations on encrypted data is a powerful tool for protecting privacy.
Recently, protocols to achieve this on classical computing systems have been found. Here we present
an efficient solution to the quantum analogue of this problem that enables arbitrary quantum com-
putations to be carried out on encrypted quantum data. We prove that an untrusted server can
implement a universal set of quantum gates on encrypted quantum bits (qubits) without learning
any information about the inputs, while the client, knowing the decryption key, can easily decrypt
the results of the computation. We experimentally demonstrate, using single photons and linear
optics, the encryption and decryption scheme on a set of gates sufficient for arbitrary quantum
computations. Because our protocol requires few extra resources compared to other schemes it can
be easily incorporated into the design of future quantum servers. These results will play a key role
in enabling the development of secure distributed quantum systems.
While quantum computers promise to solve certain
classes of problems that are intractable for classical
computers[1–4], their development is still in its infancy.
It is probable that the first quantum computers will act
as servers that potential clients can access remotely. In
such a server model, the ability to efficiently implement
quantum algorithms on encrypted quantum information
is crucial. In 2009, the first classical method for fully ho-
momorphic encryption (i.e. for performing arbitrary com-
putations over encrypted data) was developed[5]. This
enables a client with comparatively little computational
power to use an untrusted classical server for perform-
ing a computation, without compromising the security
of their data. Here we have developed the first scheme
for carrying out arbitrary computations on encrypted
qubits where the client only needs to be able to pre-
pare and send single qubits chosen among a set of four
possibilities, and to perform some limited classical com-
munication and computation. An important feature of
our protocol is that during the computation no quantum
communication between the client and the server is re-
quired. Strictly speaking, fully homomorphic encryption
requires that the client’s total number of operations be
proportional to the size of the input and output only.
Our scheme satisfies this requirement at the quantum
level, but not at the classical one, since the client’s to-
tal number of classical operations is proportional to the
size of the circuit. Nevertheless, our scheme is efficient,
requiring only a constant overhead for performing gates
on encrypted data, whereas the best known fully homo-
morphic classical solution[6] requires a polylog overhead.
Our protocol (see Fig. 1) starts with a client who has
quantum information that needs to be sent to a remote
server for processing. The client first encrypts the in-
put qubits. In the circuit model of quantum computing,
a universal set of gates, composed of unitary operations
from the Clifford group and one additional non-Clifford
gate, is required. For each non-Clifford gate to be per-
formed in the algorithm, the client must also prepare
an auxiliary qubit according to a prescription we will
specify. The client sends the encrypted quantum infor-
mation and the auxiliary qubits to the server, and the
server then sequentially performs the gates specified by
the quantum algorithm. A round of classical communica-
tion between the server and client is required every time
a non-Clifford gate is implemented (as shown in Fig. 1h),
allowing the client to update the decryption key. Af-
ter the algorithm is completed, the server returns the
encrypted qubits to the client who then decrypts them.
Once decrypted, the client has the answer to the com-
putation the server performed while the server has no
knowledge about the quantum information it has pro-
cessed. The server, however, can choose to perform a
different computation. However, for many algorithms of
interest[4], efficient classical verification methods exist,
thus enabling the detection of an incorrect output.
Our scheme is part of a rapidly developing field that
tackles the problem of secure delegated quantum com-
putation. There have been several novel approaches to
this problem, including hiding a circuit from the remote
quantum server [7, 8], computing on encrypted quan-
tum data using multiple rounds and bits of quantum
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FIG. 1. Protocol for quantum computing on encrypted data.
a, A client encrypts a quantum state |ψ〉 and sends it to a
quantum server, who performs a computation U on the en-
crypted qubit. The server returns the state which the client
decrypts to get U|ψ〉. b–g, Encryption and decryption pro-
tocols for a universal gate set. Two random classical bits
a, b ∈R {0, 1} (as well as c, d ∈R {0, 1} for the CNOT, f)
control Pauli rotations X and Z to encrypt state |ψ〉. b–f,
Clifford gates do not require any additional resources, and
decryption is straightforward. g, The non-Clifford R gate re-
quires the client to send an auxiliary qubit ZdPy|+〉, where
y, d ∈R {0, 1}, to control a CNOT gate with the encrypted
qubit. The server measures the encrypted qubit and outcome
c ∈ {0, 1} is returned to the client, which is used in decryption.
The client sends a single classical bit, x = a⊕y, to control a P
gate on the auxiliary qubit, which is returned to the client as
Xa
′′
Zb
′′
R|ψ〉, where a′′ = a⊕c and b′′ = a(c⊕y⊕1)⊕b⊕d⊕y.
h, For a computation, the client encrypts and sends |ψ〉 to be
processed, as well as auxiliary qubits, |auxi〉, for any R gates
in the computation. The server performs a series of gates
U = GN · · ·G1. Communication is only needed when gate Gi
is an R, and then only with classical bits. Processed qubits
are returned to the client for decryption.
communication[9–12], and sophisticated methods that
provide an additional verification mechanism[10–12] (see
Supplementary Table 1 for more details). While some of
these schemes, in principle, can be used to accomplish
similar outcomes as our protocol, they can lead to very
different client-server relationships in practice. For ex-
ample, a recent experiment used the measurement-based
model of quantum computing to demonstrate the com-
plementary problem of hiding from a server the circuit
that is to be performed[7, 8]. This method, known as
blind quantum computing, can be extended to compute
on encrypted data, but would require more than eight
times as many auxiliary qubits and significantly more
rounds of classical communication. Furthermore, blind
computation uses random qubits chosen from a set of
eight possibilities—our contribution reduces this to just
four.
More fundamentally, blind quantum computing de-
mands a very different relationship between the client
and server as compared to our approach that is inspired
by homomorphic encryption. In the blind model, the
client must provide both the hidden algorithm to be per-
formed and the encrypted data to be computed on; in our
scheme the client provides only the data while the server
provides the agreed upon algorithm. Our protocol mir-
rors the client-server relationships that exist today where
a server is free to focus on iterating and improving the al-
gorithms they provide. This frees the client from needing
to develop and optimize the algorithms they use, while
the server is able to specialize in providing targeted ser-
vices. In the blind model this division of labour does not
exist; the server is treated as a “dumb” resource while the
client is fully responsible for maintaining and supplying
the algorithms. While there are many scenarios where
carrying out blind quantum computing is desirable, our
protocol enables secure delegated quantum networks to
develop that closely resemble today’s client-server rela-
tionships.
In our scheme, to encrypt a qubit |ψ〉, a client applies
a combination of Pauli X and Z operations:
XaZb|ψ〉 = |ψ〉encrypted, (1)
where a and b are randomly assigned to the values of
0 or 1 and form the key. The action of the encryption
maps the initial state of the qubit to one of four possible
final states, which sum to the completely mixed state;
as long as the values a and b are used only once, this
is the quantum equivalent[13] of the classical one-time
pad. Knowing a and b, it is possible to decrypt the state
by reversing the X and Z rotations. The Clifford gates
we study include the single-qubit Pauli X and Z rota-
tions, the two-qubit controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate, and
the single-qubit Hadamard, H|j〉 7→ 1√
2
(|0〉 + (−1)j |1〉),
and phase, P|j〉 7→ (eipi/2)j |j〉, gates where j ∈ {0, 1}[14].
The actions of the Clifford gates on an encrypted qubit
are straightforward due to their commutation relations
with the Pauli operators (see Fig. 1b–f), and do not re-
quire any additional classical or quantum resources[9].
The client only needs to know what gates are being car-
ried out to update the knowledge of the decryption key.
Clifford gates alone are insufficient for universal quan-
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FIG. 2. Experimental setup. a, Photon pairs are generated
via SPDC using a frequency-doubled Ti:Sapph laser to pump
a barium borate (BBO) crystal. Photons are coupled into
single-mode fibres. b, The client prepares and encrypts the
qubit |ψ〉, upper rail, using a PBS, QWP and HWP, and then
sends it to the server. Single-qubit Clifford gates, shown as
G, are implemented as follows: X is a HWP at 45◦; Z is
a HWP at 0◦; H is a HWP at 22.5◦; P is a QWP at 0◦.
The photon is returned to the client, where it is measured
using a HWP, QWP and PBS, and detected in coincidence
with the second photon from the SPDC pair (lower rail). c,
The client prepares and encrypts |ψ〉, upper rail, as in b.
The client also prepares an auxiliary photon, lower rail, to
one of {|+〉, |−〉, |+y〉, |−y〉} using Pockels’ cells (PC1, PC2)
triggered by randomly generated classical bits y and d. The R
gate, a tilted HWP at 0◦, acts on photon |ψ〉. Both photons
pass through the CNOT, where they interfere at a PPBS. The
encrypted photon |ψ〉, in the lower rail, is measured by the
server after the CNOT, and the outcome c is used by the client
in decryption. The auxiliary photon, now in the upper rail,
passes through a third Pockels’ cell (PC3), performing Px,
where x = a ⊕ y is a classical bit sent from the client, and
is returned to the client for decryption and measurement. To
test the CNOT gate Pockels’ cells are not used, and state
preparation and measurement apparatuses are used in both
arms.
tum computing[15]; at least one non-Clifford gate is re-
quired. We study the non-Clifford R gate, which has
the following action: R|j〉 7→ (eipi/4)j |j〉 for j ∈ {0, 1}.
Performing the R gate on encrypted qubits is not triv-
ial as it does not commute through the encryption in
the same simple manner as the Clifford gates. This is
because the server, when applying the R gate, can intro-
duce an error, equivalent to applying an extra P gate,
when a = 1: RXaZb|ψ〉 = XaZa⊕bPaR|ψ〉. To prevent
the client from needing to divulge the value of a, com-
promising the security of the computation, the server im-
plements a hidden P gate that is controlled by the client
(see Fig. 1g). To do this, before the server begins the
computation the client sends as many auxiliary qubits as
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FIG. 3. Single-qubit gate results. The left panel, the client,
shows real and imaginary parts of reconstructed χ matrices
(expressed in the basis of Pauli operators) for the single-
qubit gates when decrypted. Fidelities with ideal X,Z,H,P,
and R gates are 0.984 ± 0.002, 0.985 ± 0.001, 0.983 ± 0.001,
0.985±0.001, 0.863±0.004, respectively. The right panel, the
server, shows the real parts (imaginary parts were negligible)
of the reconstructed χ matrices when not decrypted, all giving
process fidelities of F ≥ 0.999 with the completely depolariz-
ing channel. Ideal χ matrices are shown in the Supplementary
Information.
there are R gates in the circuit. These auxiliary qubits
are encoded as PyZd|+〉 with y, d ∈R {0, 1}, resulting in
one of the four following states that lie along the equa-
tor of the Bloch sphere: {|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉), |+y〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+i|1〉), |−y〉 = 1√2 (|0〉−i|1〉)}.
These are the four standard BB84 states[16] rotated to
a different basis. After the server implements an R gate,
it then performs a CNOT between one of the auxiliary
qubits and the encrypted state RXaZb|ψ〉. The server
measures the encrypted qubit in the computational ba-
sis, and returns the outcome c to the client to update
the decryption key. After the CNOT, the state of the
auxiliary qubit is Xa
′
Zb
′
Pa⊕yR|ψ〉; the extra unwanted
phase gate now depends on the values of both a and
y which only the client knows. The client sends a sin-
gle classical bit, x = a ⊕ y, which controls whether the
server implements an additional corrective P gate with-
out ever revealing the value of a. The final state is then
Xa
′′
Zb
′′
R|ψ〉 as desired, and the decryption key bits, a′′
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FIG. 4. CNOT gate results. The left panel, the client, shows real and imaginary parts of the reconstructed χ matrix for the
CNOT gate when the decryption key is known. Fidelity with the ideal CNOT gate is 0.869± 0.004. The right panel, the server,
shows the real part (imaginary part is negligible, (< 0.004)) of the χ matrix when the key is unknown. The process fidelity
with the completely depolarizing channel is 0.996± 0.001. Ideal χ matrices are shown in the Supplementary Information.
and b′′, now depend on the values of a, b, c, d, and y
as shown in Fig. 1g. This solution is inspired by circuit
manipulation techniques[17, 18]. The Supplementary In-
formation provides a detailed proof. It also provides a
novel simulation-based security definition, applicable to
any untrusted server sharing arbitrary prior information
with the client, and a proof via an entanglement-based
protocol[19].
We implement a proof-of-principle of the protocol us-
ing linear optics. The state of the qubit is encoded into
the polarization of single photons with the horizontal
and vertical polarizations representing |0〉 and |1〉 re-
spectively. Single photons are generated (see Fig. 2a)
via spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPDC).
The state preparation and encryption, XaZb|ψ〉, are car-
ried out using a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS), quarter-
waveplate (QWP) and half-waveplate (HWP), and the
single-qubit Clifford gates are implemented using wave-
plates (see Fig. 2b). The CNOT gate (see Fig. 2c)
is implemented using two-photon interference[20] at a
partially-polarizing beamsplitter (PPBS)[21–23], which
fully transmits horizontally polarized light, but reflects
2/3 of the vertical polarization.
To implement the R gate on an encrypted qubit we
use an auxiliary qubit along with the CNOT as shown
in Fig. 2c. The auxiliary qubit is randomly prepared
by the client in one of the four rotated BB84 states,
PyZd|+〉, using waveplates and Pockels’ cells as fast op-
tical switches[24–26] (see Methods), and then sent to the
server. The Pockels’ cells are switched at 1MHz – two
orders of magnitude faster than our singles rate from
SPDC. This means that the probability of more than one
photon being present for each Pockels’ cell setting is very
small, making negligible the amount of information the
server can obtain about the state of the auxiliary qubit,
and hence the value of y. The server first performs an
R gate on the encrypted qubit followed by a CNOT with
the auxiliary qubit. The client then sends the server a
classical bit, x = a⊕y, which controls whether the server
implements an additional corrective P gate using a third
Pockels’ cell. Finally, the server returns to the client the
encrypted auxiliary qubit containing the final state for
processing.
In order to characterize our gates we use quantum pro-
cess tomography (QPT)[14, 27–29]; this provides us with
complete information, in the form of a process matrix
χ, about how each gate acts on and transforms an ar-
bitrary input state. The client first prepares a set of
encrypted input states that the server acts on, and then
the client performs measurements on the outputs. For
our single-qubit gates the client prepares an overcom-
plete set of inputs that are the eigenstates of the Paulis
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉, |+y〉, |−y〉}. Our encryption scheme,
XaZb|ψ〉, maps each of these Pauli eigenstates into one
another. After the server processes the gate, the client
performs measurements in each Pauli basis. By choosing
this set of input states, and keeping track of the values
of a and b, the client is able to completely characterize
the action of the gate over all possible encryptions. Sim-
ilarly, for the two-qubit CNOT gate the client prepares
and measures all 36 eigenstates of the tensor products of
the Paulis {|00〉, |01〉, ..., |−y−y〉}. Again, the encryption
scheme maps each of the input eigenstates of the Pauli
tensor products into one another, allowing all encryption
possibilities to be studied.
The client, knowing the decryption key, is able to de-
crypt and post-process the tomography data. The results
for the decrypted single-qubit gates are shown in Fig. 3
and the results for the CNOT are shown in Fig. 4. The
fidelities[14] of the X, Z, H, P, R and CNOT gates are
0.984± 0.002, 0.985± 0.001, 0.983± 0.001, 0.985± 0.001,
0.863 ± 0.004 and 0.869 ± 0.004 respectively. Loss of fi-
delity for single-qubit Clifford gates is predominately due
to coherent noise, i.e. over- or under-rotation of a uni-
tary, meaning that multiple gates can be performed in
sequence maintaining high fidelity. Loss of fidelity for
the CNOT and R gates originates from emitted double
pairs in the photon source and mode mismatch at the
main PPBS. From the client’s perspective, the server has
performed the correct computations on the encrypted in-
puts. However, if the decryption keys are not known,
then each gate acts as a completely depolarizing channel
5that leaves input qubits in the maximally mixed state
(as shown in Fig.g 3 and Fig. 4). The process matrices
were then reconstructed from the same data as before,
but without decryption. Each case had high fidelity with
the completely depolarizing channel: 0.999±0.001 for the
single-qubit gates, and 0.996±0.001 for the CNOT. With-
out knowledge of the decryption keys, the server gains no
information about the state. For a more detailed anal-
ysis of the experimental security of our implementation
see the Supplementary Information.
In information security often the weakest link is not
the transmission of encrypted data, but, rather, secu-
rity breaches at the end points where the data is no
longer encrypted. A major advance of our scheme is that
it eliminates one of the end points as a security risk;
a remote server no longer needs to decrypt the quan-
tum information in order to process it and carry out
computations. The overhead in quantum resources re-
quired to compute on encrypted quantum data is so low
(only one auxiliary qubit per non-Clifford gate) that it
will be straightforward for future quantum servers to in-
corporate our protocol in their design, dramatically en-
hancing the security of client-server quantum computing;
our protocol has even less overhead than the best classi-
cal fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and provides
information-theoretic (as opposed to just computational)
security. This method for computing on encrypted quan-
tum data, combined with the techniques developed for
quantum circuit hiding[7, 8], form a complete security
system that will enable secure distributed quantum com-
puting to take place, ensuring the privacy and security
of future quantum networks.
Methods. In the R gate protocol, we initialize aux-
iliary photons to one of the four {|+〉, |−〉, |+y〉, |−y〉}
states using Pockels’ cells. A Pockels’ cell performs a
fast-switching unitary operation triggered by applying a
strong electric field which rapidly changes the index of
refraction of a nonlinear medium; here the medium is ru-
bidium titanyl phosphate, RbTiOPO4 (RTP). The values
of bits y and d are randomly generated by a computer,
and a trigger circuit (based on a self-built CPLD design)
is used to drive the Pockels’ cells at a rate of 1 MHz.
Single-photon rates are reduced to ∼3800 Hz to limit the
probability of two auxiliary photons being present in the
Pockels’ cells during a single setting of y and d. Reduced
rates also limit the effect of emitted double pairs on the
fidelity of the CNOT operation. Photons are detected
using silicon avalanche photo-diodes (PerkinElmer four-
channel SPCM-AQ4C modules), and coincidence photon
events are recorded using a custom design coincidence
logic. For all gates, the process that the server observed
was attained by summing the measured counts over the
all the encryption cases a, b ∈ {0, 1}. For example, if the
client input the state |0〉, then the server, not knowing the
encryption key, would half the time assume |1〉 was input
and sort the measured counts accordingly. For the R gate
the client decrypts by sorting photon counts into 8 bins
based on the values of y, d and c. The server, not knowing
values of y and d, could at most sort counts into two bins
based on c, and observes a maximally mixed state due to
the active switching, before summing over the encryption
key cases. QPT was performed using a maximum likeli-
hood technique[29, 30]. Uncertainties in these values are
found by adding Poissonian noise to the measured pho-
ton counts and performing 100 Monte Carlo iterations of
the χ matrix reconstructions.
∗ k8fisher@uwaterloo.ca
† albroadb@iqc.ca
‡ kshalm@uwaterloo.ca
[1] R. Feynman, Int. Journ. of Theor. Phys. 21, 467 (1982).
[2] D. Deutsch and R. Jozsa, Proceedings of the Royal Soci-
ety A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences,
Proc. R. Soc. A 439, 553 (1992).
[3] L. Grover, in Proceedings of the 28th annual ACM Sym-
posium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (ACM, New
York, 1996) pp. 212–219.
[4] P. Shor, SIAM J. Comput. 26, 1484 (1997).
[5] C. Gentry, in Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM Sym-
posium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (ACM Press,
New York, 2009) pp. 169–178.
[6] C. Gentry, S. Halevi, N. Smart, D. Pointcheval, and
T. Johansson, in Proceedings of the 31st annual con-
ference theory and applications of cryptographic tech-
niques (EUROCRYPT) (Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 2012) pp. 465–482.
[7] A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, in Pro-
ceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science (FOCS) (IEEE Press, Los
Alamitos, 2009) pp. 517–526.
[8] S. Barz, E. Kashefi, A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons,
A. Zeilinger, and P. Walther, Science 20, 303 (2012).
[9] A. Childs, Quantum Information and Computation 5,
456 (2005).
[10] D. Aharonov, M. Ben-Or, and E. Eban, in Proc. Innov.
Comp. Sci. (ICS) 2010 (2010) pp. 453–469.
[11] F. Dupuis, J. B. Nielsen, and L. Salvail, in Advances
in Cryptology – Proc. CRYPTO 2012 , LNCS, Vol. 7417
(Springer, 2012) pp. 794–811.
[12] A. Broadbent, G. Gutoski, and D. Stebila, “Quantum
one-time programs,” (2012), available as arXiv:1211.
1080.
[13] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. D. Wolf,
in Proceedings of the 41st Annual IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) (IEEE Press,
Los Alamitos, 2000) pp. 547–553.
[14] M. Nielsen and I. Chuang, Quantum Computation and
Quantum Information (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cam-
bridge, 2000) p. 558.
[15] D. Gottesman, in Group 22: Proceedings of the 22nd In-
ternational Colloquium on Group Theoretical Methods in
Physics (International Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998) pp.
32–43.
[16] C. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
Comp. Syst. Signal Proc. 11, 175 (1984).
6[17] X. Zhou, D. Leung, and I. Chuang, Phys. Rev. A 62,
052316 (2000).
[18] A. Childs, D. Leung, and M. Nielsen, Phys. Rev. A 71,
032318 (2005).
[19] P. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[20] C. K. Hong, Z. Y. Ou, and L. Mandel, Phys. Rev. Lett.
59, 2044 (1987).
[21] N. Kiesel, C. Schmid, U. Weber, R. Ursin, and H. We-
infurter, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 1 (2005).
[22] N. Langford, T. Weinhold, R. Prevedel, K. Resch,
A. Gilchrist, J. O‘Brien, G. J. Pryde, and A. White,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 3 (2005).
[23] R. Okamoto, H. Hofmann, S. Takeuchi, and K. Sasaki,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 210506 (2005).
[24] T. Pittman, B. Jacobs, and J. Franson, Phys. Rev. A
66, 052305 (2002).
[25] R. Prevedel, P. Walther, F. Tiefenbacher, P. Bohi,
R. Kaltenbaek, T. Jennewein, and A. Zeilinger, Nature
445, 65 (2007).
[26] X.-S. Ma, T. Herbst, T. Scheidl, D. Wang,
S. Kropatschek, W. Naylor, B. Wittmann, A. Mech,
J. Kofler, E. Anisimova, V. Makarov, T. Jennewein,
R. Ursin, and A. Zeilinger, Nature 489, 269 (2012).
[27] J. Poyatos, J. Cirac, and P. Zoller, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78,
390 (1997).
[28] J. O’Brien, G. Pryde, A. Gilchrist, D. James, N. Lang-
ford, T. Ralph, and A. White, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93,
080502 (2004).
[29] J. Chow, J. Gambetta, L. Tornberg, J. Koch, L. Bishop,
A. Houck, B. Johnson, L. Frunzio, S. Girvin, and
R. Schoelkopf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 090502 (2009).
[30] D. James, P. Kwiat, W. Munro, and A. White, Phys.
Rev. A 64, 052312 (2001).
Acknowledgements: We are grateful for finan-
cial support from Ontario Ministry of Research and
Innovation ERA, QuantumWorks, NSERC, OCE, In-
dustry Canada and CFI. A.B., L.S. and T.J. acknowl-
edge the support of the Canadian Institute for Ad-
vanced Research. R.P. acknowledges support from the
FWF (J2960-N20), MRI, the VIPS Program of the Aus-
trian Federal Ministry of Science and Research and the
City of Vienna as well as the European Commission
(Marie Curie, FP7-PEOPLE-2011-IIF). A.B. is grateful
for Serge Fehr for pointing out the proof technique of ref.
[18] and its applicability to our scenario. Author Con-
tributions: A.B. designed the protocol and proved its
security. K.F., L.S., R.P. and K.R. conceived the exper-
iment. K.F. conducted the experiment with the help of
J.L. and Z.Y. and under the supervision of K.R. and T.J.
The first draft of the manuscript was written by K.F. and
L.S. All authors contributed to the final draft.
Supplementary Information
Quantum Computing on Encrypted Data
K.A.G. Fisher†, A. Broadbent?, L.K. Shalm, Z. Yan,
J. Lavoie, R. Prevedel, T. Jennewein, K.J. Resch
Institute for Quantum Computing
University of Waterloo
? albroadb@iqc.ca, † k8fisher@uwaterloo.ca,
Contents
1 Universal Circuits 2
2 Comparison with other schemes 2
3 Correctness of the R-gate protocol 2
4 Security definition and proof 3
4.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.1 Quantum registers and channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2 Definition and proof of privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5 Ideal process matrices 6
6 Analysis of experimental security 7
6.1 Imperfect encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2 Multi-photon emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7 References 9
1
Secure Assisted Quantum Computation [Chi05] This Work
O(s) rounds of quantum communication One round of quantum communication
Clients performs quantum SWAP gate Client performs no two-qubit gates
Quantum Prover Interactive Proof [ABOE10] This Work
Client needs constant-sized quantum computer Client’s quantum power limited to encryption and
preparing random BB84 states
Verification of result No verification of result
Universal Blind Quantum Computing [BFK09] This Work
Each gate (including identity) uses:
• 8 auxiliary qubits (chosen out of 8 possibilities)
• 32 bits of classical communication
• Clifford group gates are non-interactive
• R-gate requires a single auxiliary qubit (cho-
sen out of 4 possibilities) and 1 bit of classical
communication in each direction.
Table 1 – Comparison with related work
1 Universal Circuits
Let C be a collection of quantum circuits acting on n-qubits. A quantum circuit U on n + m qubits is
universal for C if, for every circuit C ∈ C, there is a string x ∈ {0, 1}m (the encoding) such that for all inputs
y ∈ {0, 1}n, U(|y〉 ⊗ |x〉) = C(|y〉)⊗ |x〉.
Given such a C ∈ C, we apply our scheme for computing on encrypted data, where the circuit is U and
we append to the input the basis state |x〉 before encryption. We thus achieve hiding of not only the data,
but also the value x, which represents the index of C within C.
The complexity (in terms of communication and auxiliary qubits) of the resulting scheme for a fixed
C depends on the collection C that is chosen, together with the choice of U . Clearly, the complexity can
only increase compared to executing C on encrypted data. A typical scenario would be to hide a circuit C
consisting of g gates within all circuits of the same configuration, but where each gate position consists of
H,R,CNOT or the identity[BFK09]. A solution would be for U to act on n+ 3g qubits, with each gate being
controlled-versions of H,R and CNOT where the control-bits are part of the encoding, x. The straightforward
solution based on [NC00] and [BFGH10] requires twenty-four R gates per position. Interesting open questions
are improving this scheme, as well as determining efficient universal circuits for fixed collections of quantum
circuits (see [SR07, BFGH10]).
2 Comparison with other schemes
Previous results have achieved similar functionality, but require more resources. Comparisons with related
work are summarized in Table 1, where s in the size of the circuit.
3 Correctness of the R-gate protocol
We give below a step-by-step proof of the correctness of the R-gate protocol as given in Figure 1g. The basic
building block is the circuit identity for an X-teleportation from [ZDC00], which we re-derive here. Also of
relevance to this work are the techniques developed by Childs, Leung, and Nielsen [CLN05] to manipulate
circuits that produce an output that is correct up to known Pauli corrections.
We will make use of the following identities which all hold up to an irrelevant global phase: XZ = ZX,
PZ = ZP, PX = XZP, RZ = ZR, RX = XZPR, P2 = Z and Pa⊕b = Za·bPa+b (for a, b ∈ {0, 1}).
1. Our first circuit identity swaps a qubit |ψ〉 with the state |+〉 and is easy to verify.
2. We can measure the top qubit in the above circuit and classically control the output correction. We
have thus re-derived the circuit corresponding to the “X-teleportation” of [ZDC00].
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|ψ〉 • |+〉
|+〉 • |ψ〉
|ψ〉 c
|+〉 • Xc|ψ〉
3. Next, we re-define the input to be RXaZb|ψ〉, so the output becomes XcRXaZb|ψ〉 = Xa⊕cZa⊕bPaR|ψ〉.
XaZb|ψ〉 R c
|+〉 • Xa⊕cZa⊕bPaR|ψ〉
4. Then add three gates (Py, Zd, Pa⊕y) to the bottom wire (see circuit below). Using the fact that the P
and Z commute with control, and applying identities given above, we get as output what we expect:
Pa⊕yZdPyXa⊕cZa⊕bPaR|ψ〉 = Za·yPa+yZdPyXa⊕cZa⊕bPaR|ψ〉 (1)
= Zd⊕a·y⊕yPaXa⊕cZa⊕bPaR|ψ〉 (2)
= Zd⊕a·y⊕yXa⊕cZa(a⊕c)PaZa⊕bPaR|ψ〉 (3)
= Xa⊕cZd⊕a·y⊕y⊕a
2⊕a·cZbR|ψ〉 (4)
= Xa⊕cZa(c⊕y⊕1)⊕b⊕d⊕yR|ψ〉 (5)
XaZb|ψ〉 R c
|+〉 Py Zd • Pa⊕y Xa⊕cZa(c⊕y⊕1)⊕b⊕d⊕yR|ψ〉
4 Security definition and proof
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Quantum registers and channels
A quantum register is a collection of qubits in some finite dimensional Hilbert space, say X . We denote
D(X ) the set of density operators acting on X . The set of all linear mappings from X to Y is denoted by
L(X ,Y), with L(X ) being a shorthand for L(X ,X ). A linear super-operator Φ : L(X )→ L(Y) is admissible if
it is completely positive and trace-preserving. Admissible super-operators represent mappings from density
operators to density operators, that is, they represent the most general quantum maps.
Given admissible super-operators Φ and Ψ that agree on input space L(X ) and output space L(Y), we
are interested (for cryptographic purposes) in characterizing how “indistinguishable” these processes are.
The diamond norm provides such a measure: given that Φ or Ψ is applied with equal probability, the
optimal procedure to determine the identity of the channel with only one use succeeds with probability
1/2 + ‖Φ−Ψ‖/4. Here,
‖Φ−Ψ‖ = max{‖(Φ⊗ 1W)(ρ)− (Ψ⊗ 1W)(ρ)‖1 : ρ ∈ D(X ⊗W)} , (6)
where W is any space with dimension equal to that of X and 1W is the identity in L(W), and where the
trace norm of an operator X is defined as ‖X‖1 = Tr
√
X∗X .
4.2 Definition and proof of privacy
Our protocol provides the same level of security as the one-time pad, that is, it provides perfect (information-
theoretic) privacy. The rest of this section formalizes the definition of privacy based on simulations and gives
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a proof based on the technique of giving an equivalent, entanglement-based protocol. For our definition
of privacy, we have used notions similar to those introduced by Watrous in the context of quantum zero-
knowledge interactive proof systems [Wat09]. We use as proof technique the method of transforming a qubit-
based protocol into an equivalent protocol that is more easily proved secure, but that involves entanglement.
This technique is attributed to Shor and Preskill [SP00], who used it in the context of proving the security
of the BB84 [BB84] quantum key exchange protocol, and has since appeared in the context of quantum
message authentication [BCG+02], cryptography in the bounded-quantum-storage model [DFSS05], and in
recent independent work on delegated quantum computation [DFPR13].
Formally, a protocol for delegated computation is specified by a pair (C, S) representing an honest client
and an honest server (without loss of generality, both parties are quantum). As the client is always honest,
the security property concerns interactions between pairs (C, S′) where S′ deviates arbitrarily from S. At
the onset of the protocol, both parties agree on the classical input q which determines the general quantum
circuit to be executed as an ordered series of gates acting on specified wires. The structure of the interaction
between C and S is thus determined by q. At the same time, a quantum input ρin ∈ D(C ⊗S) is distributed,
C receiving the register in C and S receiving the register in S. A cheating server S′ is any quantum
computational process that interacts with C according to the message structure determined by q. By
allowing S′ access to the input register S, we explicitly allow S′ to share prior entanglement with C’s input;
this also models any prior knowledge of S′ and formalizes the notion that the protocol cannot be used to
increase knowledge.
Let Z denote the output space of S′ and let Φq : L(S)→ L(Z) be the mapping induced by the interaction
of S′ with C. Security is defined in terms of the existence of a simulator SS′ for a given server S′, which is
a general quantum circuit that agrees with S′ on the input and output dimensions. Such a simulator does
not interact with C or with any other resources, but simply induces a mapping Ψq : L(S) → L(Z) on each
input q. Informally, (C, S) is private if the two mappings, Φq and Ψq are indistinguishable for every choice of q
and every choice of ρin. The intuitive argument for privacy is that any such simulator SS′ , by definition,
does not have access (even indirectly) to the client’s register C, and thus necessarily cannot extract any
information from C (this is called the ideal world scenario). The mapping Φq models the cheating behaviour
of S′ as a quantum channel. The security notion is that there should exist, for every cheating server S′ in
the actual protocol (this is called the real world scenario), a simulator SS′ that induces an indistinguishable
mapping. Since the simulator’s mapping models a private protocol, the mapping of the original server SS′
must also model a private protocol. The above is the familiar ideal/real-world simulation-based security
paradigm, simplified because the server does not have access to any ideal functionality, modelling the notion
of privacy that the server should “learn nothing”. Allowing for an  amount of leakage, we formalize this as
Definition 1.
Definition 1. A protocol (C, S) for a delegated quantum computation is -private if for every server S′ there
exists a simulator SS′ such that for every classical input q,
‖Φq −Ψq‖ ≤  , (7)
where Φq is the mapping induced by the interaction of S
′ with the client C on input q and Ψq is the mapping
induced by SS′ on input q.
Taking  = 0 gives the strongest possible security against a malicious server: it does not allow for even
an  amount of leakage, and allows the server to deviate arbitrarily (without imposing any computational
bounds). Theorem 1 states that this is the level of privacy achieved in our protocol.
Our proof technique is to construct a sequence of protocols. For clarity, we refer to the protocol in the
main paper as Protocol 1. A high-level sketch of the proof is that we modify the behaviour of the client
in the main protocol (Protocol 1) in a way that the effect of the protocol is unchanged, yet the client
delays introducing her input into the protocol until after her interaction with the server has ended (this
makes the simulation almost trivial because no access to the client’s input is required). In order to do so,
we describe below an entanglement-based protocol (Protocol 2) as well as a delayed-measurement protocol
(Protocol 3).
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 is an -private protocol for delegated quantum computation, with  = 0.
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Proof. Fix a value for q. We construct a simulator SS′ by giving instructions how to prepare messages that
replace the messages that the client C would send to the server S′ in the real protocol. Privacy follows since
we will show that these transmissions are identical to those in the real protocol.
We first consider Protocol 2, which is an entanglement-based version of Protocol 1. In Protocol 2,
we modify how the client prepares her messages, without modifying the server’s actions or the effect of the
protocol. Thus, the preparing and sending of an encrypted quantum register is replaced by an equivalent
teleportation-based protocol, as given in Figure 1. Also, the R-gate protocol is replaced by an equivalent
protocol as given in Figure 3. The protocol of Figure 3 can be seen to be correct via an intermediate protocol
(Figure 2), in which the classical bit x from the client to the server becomes a uniformly random bit; this
transformation is possible because in the R-gate protocol, x = a⊕ y with y a random bit. Then choosing x
to be random and y = a⊕x gives an equivalent protocol. The final entanglement-based protocol of Figure 3
is seen to be correct via the circuit identity given in Figure 4. The remaining protocols for stabilizer circuit
elements (Clifford gates, qubit preparation and measurements) are non-interactive and thus unchanged in
Protocol 2.
The main advantage of considering Protocol 2 instead of Protocol 1 is that we can delay all the client’s
measurements (in Figures 1 and 3) until the output register is returned, without affecting the computation
or the server’s view of the protocol (because actions on different subsystems commute); call the result
Protocol 3. In this delayed-measurement protocol, the messages from the client to the server can be chosen
before any interaction with the server, and are thus clearly independent of the actions of S′.
For any cheating server S′ we thus construct a simulator SS′ that performs the following interactive
process that emulates the real-world execution of the protocol between S′ and C: the client’s operations
are the same as the client’s operations in Protocol 3, but no measurements are performed. (Thus, SS′
does not require access to the input register C.) The server’s operations are the same as given by S′. We
now need to show that SS′ induces the same mapping, Φq as the mapping Ψq induced by S′. In order
to do this, note that in the construction above, SS′ actually prepares the same transmissions as would
C in Protocol 1 interacting with S′ on any input ρin. It follows that running S′ on these transmissions
(i.e. executing S′ as given by its description) will induce the same mapping as S′ in the real protocol, and
thus ‖Φq −Ψq‖ = 0 .
Server XaZb|ψ〉
Client
|0〉 H •
|0〉 a
|ψ〉 • H b

Figure 1 – Protocol to encrypt and send a qubit using teleportation[BBC+93]. The circuit in the
dashed box prepares an EPR-pair.
XaZb|ψ〉 R •
Server • •
• Px Xa⊕cZa(c⊕y⊕1)⊕b⊕d⊕yR|ψ〉
Client
x ∈R {0, 1} • • c
|+〉 Py Zd (d ∈R {0, 1}, y = a⊕ x)


Figure 2 – Intermediate Protocol for an R-gate. Compared to Figure 1g in the main text, the classical
message from the client to the server is chosen uniformly at random. This protocol performs
the same computation as the protocol in Figure 1g in the main text.
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XaZb|ψ〉 R •
Server • •
• Px Xa⊕cZa(c⊕y⊕1)⊕b⊕d⊕yR|ψ〉
x ∈R {0, 1} • • c
Client |0〉 H • (y = a⊕ x)
|0〉 Py H d


Figure 3 – Entanglement-based protocol for an R-gate. This protocol performs the same computation
as the protocols in Figure 1g in the main text and Figure 2. The circuit in the dashed box
prepares an EPR-pair.
|0〉 H • ZdPy|+〉
|0〉 Py H d
Figure 4 – Circuit identity: entanglement-based circuit that prepares a qubit ZdPy|+〉 for uniformly
random bits y and d (here, y is chosen uniformly at random, and d is determined by the
measurement). The circuit in the dashed box prepares an EPR-pair.
5 Ideal process matrices
Below we show the ideal χ matrices for each of the gates in the universal set {X,Z,H,P,R,CNOT}. In
the main manuscript, we present χ matrices graphically. The following figures show the ideal χ matrices
corresponding to those in Figures 3 and 4 in the manuscript. Process matrices are most commonly expressed
in the basis of Pauli operators, {1, X, Y, Z} for single-qubit processes, and {1 ⊗ 1,1 ⊗ X, ..., Z ⊗ Z} for
two-qubit processes. Here we write process matrices as having a trace of unity, though another common
convention is for the trace to equal the dimension of the system (eg., 2 for a single-qubit process). Pauli
operators are straightforward to write in this basis as they only have one element in the χ matrix. Recall
that the X Pauli operator has the following action: X|j〉 7→ |j¯〉, j ∈ {0, 1}. Its process matrix is given by
χX =

0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 (8)
The Z Pauli operator has the following action: Z|j〉 7→ (−1)j |j〉, j ∈ {0, 1}, and has process matrix:
χZ =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
 (9)
Other gates such as the Hadamard, can be written as coherent superposition of Pauli operators, H =
1√
2
(X + Z), and will have off-diagonal terms in the χ matrix, as seen below:
χH =
1
2

0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
 (10)
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The phase, P, gate has the following action: P|j〉 = ij |j〉, j ∈ {0, 1}. It can also be written as a superposition
of the identity, 1, and Z Pauli operators: P = 1√
2
(1− iZ). Its process matrix is given by
χP =
1
2

1 0 0 i
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
−i 0 0 1
 (11)
Recall, the R gate has the following action: R|j〉 = (eipi4 )j |j〉, j ∈ {0, 1}. Again, it can be written as a
superposition Pauli operators: R = (cos pi81− i sin pi8Z). Its process matrix is given by
χR =

1
4
(
2 +
√
2
)
0 0 i
2
√
2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
− i
2
√
2
0 0 14
(
2−√2)
 (12)
The last gate we look at is the CNOT, which has the following action CNOT|j〉|k〉 7→ |j〉|k ⊕ j〉, j, k ∈ {0, 1}.
In the basis of Pauli operators, it is written as CNOT = 12 (1⊗1+1⊗X+Z⊗1+Z⊗X). Its process matrix
is
χCNOT =
1
4

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0
−1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(13)
We compare the server’s results from quantum process tomography to the compleltely depolarizing chan-
nel. The the action of this channel on a density matrix ρ is ρ 7→ 14 (1ρ1 + XρX + YρY + ZρZ). Its process
matrix is then diagonal,
χdep. =
1
4

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 (14)
Similarly for two-qubit processes, the completely depolarizing channel has only diagonal elements, and so
χdep. =
1
16116, where 1d is the d-dimensional identity matrix.
6 Analysis of experimental security
Our experimental implementation serves as a proof-of-principle for our protocol of quantum computing on
encrypted data, and as such is bound by some limitations. In this section we discuss methods of the server
might use to break the client’s encryption via experimental imperfections, or multiple photon emissions from
the source.
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6.1 Imperfect encryption
As is the case for the quantum server, our experimental client suffers from imperfect gate fidelities. In
particular, the encryption operation differs from the ideal encryption XaZb. Performing a quantum process
tomography using the same method as in the main text, we found that the client’s single-qubit encryption
operations had the following fidelities, Fab:
a b Fab
0 0 0.976
0 1 0.986
1 0 0.989
1 1 0.957
The ideal encryption operation on an input state ρ, when mixed over the different cases of a and b, can
be expressed by
ρidenc =
1
4
∑
ab
XaZbρZbXa. (15)
This can be written as a diagonal process matrix χidenc =
1
41. Assuming that any departure from the ideal
encryption operation leaves the original state ρ as is, we express it by a similar mapping
ρexpenc =
1
4
∑
ab
(
Fab · XaZbρZbXa + (1− Fab) · ρ
)
. (16)
This can be written as a diagonal process matrix χexpenc with entries { 14 (1−F01−F10−F11), 14F01, 14F10, 14F11}.
In the theoretical discussion of Section 4, we use the diamond norm as a distance measure. However, since
the calculating the diamond norm from experimental data is computationally intensive, involving a maximiza-
tion over an arbitrary amount of ancilla systems, we instead compare the experimental encryption operation
against the ideal using the maximal trace distance measure. This is defined as D = maxρ 12Tr
∣∣ρexpenc − ρidenc∣∣,
where |A| =
√
A†A and the input state ρ is in a two-dimensional Hilbert space. Operationally, D is the high-
est probability of distinguishing between the experimental and ideal encryption operations when inputting
the appropriate single qubit state. We calculate our experimental encryption operation to have a maximum
trace distance of 0.014 away from the ideal, where the maximizing input state is close to ρ = |R〉〈R|.
6.2 Multi-photon emissions
Our implementation of the full protocol demonstrates that, with only modest additional resources, the
required gates can be performed. While the protocol is secure, experimental imperfections can provide the
server with side channels from which they can learn information about the client’s key. In our experiment
the primary security flaw is caused by emission of multiple photon pairs.
The Clifford gates we study are secure against the server obtaining multiple copies of the encrypted
qubits. Even if the server obtains multiple copies of the encrypted data the server cannot learn the key. The
R gate, however, presents a malicious server with an opportunity to discover a portion of the client’s key. To
carry out the R gate, the client must send the server an auxiliary qubit that is used to hide the value of the
encryption bit a from the server. The auxiliary qubit is prepared in one of the four BB84 states, ZdPy|+〉,
according to the randomly chosen classical bits y and d. If the server obtains multiple copies of this auxiliary
qubit, then the value of a can be determined and the key discovered.
To implement the fast, random, switching between BB84 states during the experiment we used Pockels’
cells which performed the unitaries Py and Zd. Although we reduce the photon rates emitted from the
source, and switch the Pockels’ cells quickly (1 MHz), we still have the possibility that multiple photons can
be present during a single setting of the Pockels’ cells. Based on single and coincident photon detections in
each arm of the experiment, we can estimate the average number of photons passing through the Pockels’
cells during a single setting. After losses in fibre-coupling, the CNOT gate, and in the detectors we measure
the efficiency of the auxiliary photon path and estimate the number of photons present in the Pockels’ cell to
be on average 0.96 during a single setting of y and d. This confirms that the Pockels’ cell switching, paired
with reduced photon rates, is approaching what is required for security against the server. Faster switching
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of the Pockels’ cells, or equivalently, employing a laser with a repetition rate matching that of the Pockels’
cells (such as a pulse picker), along with better photon sources, and a higher system efficiency would allow
this security to be improved significantly.
Unless the optical setup has a high efficiency, the client could be leaking information to the server. A
primary stumbling block to the efficiency of the optical setup is the implementation of the CNOT gate. The
configuration has a success probability of 1/9 and the server obtains many additional photons without the
client’s knowledge, which can in principle be used to break the encryption. While this presents a major
security issue, we emphasize that the issue is strictly technological and not fundamental. A photonic imple-
mentation is useful for a proof-of-principle of our protocol, but a high-fidelity, deterministic implementation
of the CNOT gate will drastically improve the experimental security.
This is the first demonstration of a delegated quantum computation that has security. Previous work
[BKB+12] did not employ fast switching and could be broken by a server who has access to more than one
copy of the qubit and could be broken due to the server’s access to several identical copies of the auxiliary
qubits. A security proof which takes into account the amount of information leaked to the server, e.g.,
establishing entropic bounds, is beyond the scope of the current work and will be the subject of future
research.
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